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Abstract 
We look at the problem of revising fuzzy be­
lief bases, i.e., belief base revision in which 
both formulas in the base as well as revision­
input formulas can come attached with vary­
ing truth-degrees. Working within a very 
general framework for fuzzy logic which is 
able to capture certain types of uncertainty 
calculi as well as truth-functional fuzzy log­
ics, we show how the idea of rational change 
from "crisp" base revision, as embodied by 
the idea of partial meet (base) revision, can 
be faithfully extended to revising fuzzy belief 
bases. We present and axiomatise an oper­
ation of partial meet fuzzy base revision and 
illustrate how the operation works in several 
important special instances of the framework. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The ability to rationally change one's beliefs in the 
face of new information which, possibly, contradicts 
the currently held beliefs is a basic characteristic of 
intelligent behaviour. Hence the question of belief re­
vision is an important question in AI. A very successful 
framework in which this question is studied is the one 
due to Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) 
[1, 4], with its operation of partial meet revision. One 
limitation of this framework is that belief in a for­
mula is taken as a matter of all or nothing: either 
the formula is believed or it is not. However, real­
life knowledge bases may well contain information of 
a more graded nature. For instance we might want to 
represent information about vague concepts or uncer­
tain beliefs. Likewise revision inputs may come with a 
degree attached. Our aim in this paper is to examine 
revision in the general setting which allows for such 
different degrees, while keeping the spirit of AGM. 
As a most suitable backdrop in which to work out our 
ideas we choose a very general framework for fuzzy 
logic due to Gerla [7]. The basic construct here is that 
of an abstract fuzzy deduction system, which gener­
alises Tarski's notion of deductive systems. Roughly, 
this consists of three basic ingredients: (i) a set L 
of formulas to describe the world, (ii) a set W of 
truth-degrees (whose precise interpretation is mostly 
left open) which may be assigned to the formulas to 
create fuzzy belief bases, and (iii) a fuzzy deduction op­
erator D which takes as input a fuzzy base u and re­
turns another fuzzy base D(u) representing its (fuzzy) 
conclusions. Sometimes a fourth ingredient is included 
- a fuzzy semantics M - in which case we speak of an 
abstract fuzzy logic. When W = {0, 1} we find our­
selves in the usual "crisp" setting of AGM. The frame­
work has also been shown capable of capturing sev­
eral different flavours of uncertain reasoning, including 
truth-functional logic and certain types of probabilis­
tic logic. 
Within this fuzzy framework, the question of revision 
we are interested in then takes the following form: 
Given a fuzzy base u representing our current informa­
tion, how should we change u to incorporate the new 
information that the truth-degree of some formula ¢ 
is at least a for some a E W? In this paper we as­
sume that the object of change u is an arbitrary fuzzy 
base which need not be deductively closed, i.e., possi­
bly u # D(u). Indeed, following the often referred-to 
distinction made in the belief revision literature (e.g. 
[13, p. 22]), our approach will be foundationalist rather 
than coherentist. That is, we differentiate between 
those beliefs which are "basic" or "explicit", ( u) and 
those which are "merely derived" or "implicit" (i.e., 
that information in D(u) which goes strictly beyond 
that contained in u). 
The original AGM theory was a theory about how 
to revise deductively closed sets of formulas, but the 
more general case of revising arbitrary (crisp) bases 
has also been studied, notably by Hansson [11, 13], 
who axiomatically characterised partial meet base re-
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VISIOn. We will generalise this operation into partial 
meet fuzzy base revision and give an axiomatisation. 
Surprisingly, despite the increase in complexity which 
admitting many truth-degrees brings, the form of the 
axiomatisation is roughly the same as in the crisp case. 
This shows how the principles on which partial meet 
revision are based really require very little structure. 
The set of truth-degrees is not even required to be 
linearly-ordered - any complete, distributive lattice 
will do. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we set 
up the framework of abstract fuzzy logic and describe 
some instances of it, including those related to truth­
functional fuzzy logics, necessity logic and probability 
logic. In Sect. 3 we define partial meet fuzzy base re­
vision operators and give examples to illustrate how 
these operators work for each instance of the frame­
work from the previous section. We give the axioma­
tisation of partial meet fuzzy base revision in Sect. 4. 
Finally we conclude in Sect. 5. 
2 ABSTRACT FUZZY LOGIC 
Our first task is to formally define abstract fuzzy de­
duction systems. The following definitions are based 
on [7]. As we said above, we assume L to be the set 
of all formulas. We take the set W of all possible 
truth-degrees to be a complete lattice, i.e., we assume 
W to come equipped with a partial order :Sw on W 
such that every A � W has both a supremum (or 
join) sup(A) and an infimum (or meet) inf(A). For 
a,b E W we write a'Wb for sup({a, b}) and a�b for 
inf ({a, b}). Often (for instance in our examples) W 
will be linearly ordered (e.g., the real unit interval). 
However, in general the only additional assumption we 
make about W is that it is also distributive, i.e., that 
for all a, b, c E W we have a �(b We) = (a �b) W(a �c), 
equivalently, aW(b�c) = (aWb)�(aWc).1 We use Ow 
and 1 w to denote the minimal and maximal elements 
ofW. 
A fuzzy belief base is then just an assignment u : L -t 
W of truth-degrees to the formulas. Such a piece of 
information u should be understood as an under con­
straint, i.e. u(¢) = a means that the truth-degree of 
¢ is at least a. We denote the set of all possible fuzzy 
bases by F(L) . The ordering :Sw induces a "fuzzy 
subset" relation � on F(L) by taking, for u, v E F(L) , 
u � v iff u(¢) :Sw v(¢) for all ¢ E L. The meaning 
of this is that v carries more (or more exact) infor­
mation than u. With this definition it is easy to see 
that (F(L), � )  forms a complete, distributive lattice. 
Given X � F(L) we shall denote the supremum and 
1 For another general approach to modelling uncertainty 
which likewise relaxes the assumption of linearity see [10]. 
infimum of X under � by U X and n X respectively. 
We write uUv for U{u, v} and unv for n{u, v}. We 
have the following, for all X� F(L) and ¢ E L, 
[Ux] (¢) = sup({u(¢) I u E X}) 
[nx] (<Pl = inf ({u(¢) 1 u EX}) 
We use C to denote the strict part of �· The C­
maximal element of F(L) , i.e., the fuzzy base which 
assigns degree 1 w to every formula, will be denoted 
by UJ.. The �-minimal element of F(L) , i.e., the 
fuzzy base which assigns degree Ow to every for­
mula, will be denoted by u T. For a fuzzy base u 
we call the set of formulas ¢ for which u( ¢) of Ow 
the support of u and denote this set by Supp(u). If 
Supp(u) = {¢1, . . .  , <Pk} is finite then we may repre­
sent u as {(¢r/ai), . . .  , (¢k/ak)} with the interpreta­
tion that u(¢i) = ai fori= 1, . . .  , k. We will often use 
(¢/a) to denote the base { (¢/a)}. Although the sup­
port of a fuzzy base will typically be finite, the results 
we describe will be valid for arbitrary u. 
The tool for drawing conclusions is the fuzzy deduction 
operator D : F(L) -t F(L) . It is assumed to satisfy 
analogues of the three basic Tarski properties: 
• u � v implies D(u) � D(v) 
• D(D(u)) = D(u) 
•u�D(u) 
(Monotony) 
(Idem potence) 
(Reflexivity) 
If D(u) = u1. then we say that u is D-inconsistent, 
otherwise D-consistent. (We omit the "D-" if it is 
clear from the context.) A (fuzzy) theory is any fixed 
point of D. Another property of D, which will be 
important to us, is logical compactness: 
Definition 1 ([7]) Let D : F(L) -t F(L) be a de­
duction operator. Then D is logically compact iff we 
have D(U X) of u1. for all X � F(L) such that (i) 
u E X implies D(u) of UJ., and (ii) for all u, v E X 
there exists w E X  such that u U v � w. 
Using an order-theoretical term, the definition says 
that D is logically compact iff the supremum of ev­
ery directed family of D-consistent fuzzy bases is itself 
D-consistent. 
We are now able to give the following formal definition: 
Definition 2 An abstract fuzzy deduction system is 
a triple (L, W, D) where L is a set of formulas, W is 
a complete, distrib utive lattice of truth-degrees and D 
is a logically compact fuzzy deduction operator which 
satisfies (Monotony), (Idempotence) and (Reflexivity). 
Sometimes (especially for our exam pies) it is conve­
nient to describe the deduction operator D of an ab­
stract fuzzy deduction system semantically. An ab­
stract fuzzy semantics is a subset M of F(L) , such 
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that Uj_ (/_ M, whose elements are called models. In­
tuitively the models represent complete descriptions of 
"possible worlds", whereas the fuzzy bases u not in M 
represent incomplete knowledge. An element m E M 
is a model of a fuzzy base u if u � m. We denote the set 
of models of u in M by modM ( u). An abstract fuzzy 
semantics M yields a fuzzy deduction operator JM by 
setting, for each u E :F(L), JM (u) = nmodM (u). It 
is easy to see that J M satisfies (Monotony), (Idem po­
tence) and (Reflexivity), and also that a fuzzy base u 
is 1M -consistent iff modM (u) ,P 0. 
Definition 3 An abstract fuzzy logic is a quadruple 
(L, W, D, M) where (L, W, D) is an abstract fuzzy de­
duction system and M is an abstract fuzzy semantics 
such that D = JM {i.e., the "completeness theorem" 
holds). 
For any abstract fuzzy deduction system we can always 
associate a suitable semantics: just take M to be the 
set of all D-consistent theories. 
2.1 CONCRETE EXAMPLES 
We now give a few example instantiations of the above 
framework. In each of these we take the set of formulas 
to be the set of formulas LProp from a propositional 
language closed under the connectives •, II, V and -t. 
We treat () B r.P as an abbreviation for ( () -t ¢) /1 
( r.P -t ()) . We denote the classical logical consequence 
operator of propositional logic by Cn. 
2.1.1 Crisp Deduction Systems 
The simplest example of a set of truth-degrees is, of 
course, the case when W consists of just two elements 
{0, 1} standing for "false" and "true" respectively. In 
this case belief bases u are "crisp", i.e., they corre­
spond to (characteristic functions of) sets of formulas 
in LProp, and �' n, U effectively reduce to the usual 
�� n, U (thus in this case we write the more usual 
"<P E u" rather than "u(¢) = 1" etc.). In the belief 
revision literature it is customary to assume that, in 
addition to (Monotony), (Idempotence) and (Reflex­
ivity), the deduction operator D satisfies the following 
three rules: 
• If¢ E Cn(u) then r.P E D(u) (Supraclassicality) 
• r.P E D(uU {()}) iff (() -t rjJ) E D(u) (Deduction) 
• If¢ E D(u) then r.P E D(u') for some finite u' � u 
(Compactness) 
We shall call an abstract fuzzy deduction system of 
the form (LProp, {0, l}, D) where D satisfies the above 
three properties a crisp deduction system. That D is 
logically compact follows from the following observa­
tion, which is easy to verify: 
Proposition 1 Let D : 2LP,op -t 2LP,op be a deduc­
tion operator which satisfies (Supraclassicality) and 
{Deduction). Then D satisfies (Compactness) iff D 
is logically compact in the sense of Definition 1. 
Thus we see that, for crisp deduction systems, the 
property of logical compactness collapses into the 
usual notion of compactness. Note that for a seman­
tics here we could take M to consist of all the maximal 
consistent theories. 
2.1.2 Lukasiewicz Fuzzy Logic 
In the rest of our examples we take W = [0, 1], i.e., 
the real unit interval equipped with the usual order­
ing ::;. Each example will differ only in the choice of 
a semantics, i.e., '.vhat counts as a "possible world", 
leading to different types of deduction operator. The 
first is related to infinitely many-valued Lukasiewicz 
logic (see, for example [8, 15]). We take as the seman­
tics the set Mluk of all truth-functional valuations over 
LProp in the many-valued Lukasiewicz logic, i.e., the 
set of functions m : LProp -t [0, 1] satisfying, for all 
() , ¢ E LProp, 
m( ..,()) 
m((J II rjJ) 
m(evrp) 
m((J -t r.P) 
1 - m(e) 
m((J) /Am(¢) 
m((J) VIm(¢) 
1 !A(l- m(O) + m(¢)) 
(Note that here "-t" does not behave as material im­
plication.) So here the "fuzziness" arises from hav­
ing worlds with graded properties. We then take 
Dluk = JMiuk" It can be shown [15, Lemma 4.17] that 
for any given fuzzy base u we have 
u U ( rp /a) is inconsistent iff Dluk ( u) ( •<P) > 1 - a ( *) 
We also have the following: 
Proposition 2 ( [7]) Dluk is logically compact. 
For an example of a fuzzy base in this logic let x, y, z 
be distinct propositional variables and consider: 
uo = {(x/0.75), (x -t yj0.75), (z/0.25)}. 
For an example of an inference we have Dluk (uo) (y) = 
0.5, i.e., we infer that the truth-degree of y is at least 
0.5. To see this, we have 
Dluk(uo)(y) = inf{m(y) I mE modMiuk (uo)}. 
Hence it suffices to show that 0.5 ::; m(y) for all 
m E modMiuk (uo), with equality holding for at least 
one m. So let m E modM1uk (uo). Then we have 
0.75::; m(x), 0.75::; m(x -t y), and 0.25::; m (z). 
Unpacking the second constraint gives us 
0.75::; 1 !A(l- m(x) + m (y)) 
which leads to m(x)- 0.25::; m(y). 
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Since 0.75 ::;- m (x) this gives us the desired 0.5 S" m(y). 
Furthermore, we can obtain equality here by choosing 
moE modM1.k (uo) such that mo(x) = 0.75,mo(Y) = 
0.5 and mo(z) = 0.25. Hence Dluk(uo)(y) = 0.5 
as required. By similar reasoning we can also show 
D1uk(uo)(y II z) = min{0.5,0.25} = 0.25, i.e., we infer 
that the truth-degree of y liz is at least 0.25. So, by ( *) 
above, we know u0 U ( �(y II z) jb) will be inconsistent 
for any b > 0.75. 
2.1.3 Necessity Logic 
Our final two examples show how the framework is 
also able to capture some types of non-truth-functional 
belief. The first of these, which corresponds to possi­
bilistic logic [3], was described within this framework 
in [6]. For the semantics we take the set MN of all ne­
cessity functions over Lp,0p, i.e., the set of functions 
n : LProp -+ [0, 1) which satisfy, for all 8, r/J E £, 
(NI) If BE Cn(0) then n(B) = 1 and nHJ) = 0. 
(N2) If (B ++ ¢) E Cn(0) then n(B) = n(¢). 
(N3) n(B II¢) = n(B) !An(¢). 
We then take DN = J Mw 
Proposition 3 ([6]) DN is logically compact. 
In this logic the notion of consistency is reducible to 
classical propositional consistency, in that a fuzzy base 
u is Dwconsistent iff Supp(u) is Cn-consistent. Also, 
if u is consistent (and ¢ f. Cn(0)) then DN(u)(¢) may 
be determined from the values given to those formulas 
which classically imply ¢ as follows: 
DN(u)(¢) = 
sup{u(BI)!A . . .  !Au(Bk) I¢ E Cn({B1, . . .  , Bk})} 
(If ¢ E Cn(0) then clearly DN(u)(¢) = 1.) For ex­
ample using the same fuzzy base uo as in the previous 
example we get DN(uo)(y) = 0.75 and DN(uo)(yllz) = 
0.25. 
2.1.4 Probability Logic (Lower Envelopes) 
Our last example is probabilistic. It is the logic of 
"lower envelopes" studied in [5].2 This time we take 
as a semantics the set Mp of all probability functions 
over LProp, i.e., all functions p : Lp,0p -+ [0, 1] which 
satisfy, for all 8, r/J E LProp, 
(PI) If BE Cn(0) then p(B) = 1. 
(P2) If �(B II¢) E Cn(0) then p(B V ¢) = p(B) + p(¢). 
Then every "world" contains complete information of 
a random phenomena. We then take Dp = JMp· 
Proposition 4 ( [5, 6]) Dp is logically compact. 
2See also [6] for some more examples of "probability­
like" logics within this framework. 
A fuzzy base u then gives a lower constraint for an 
unknown probability distribution. The deduction op­
erator Dp(u) improves the initial constraint. It is easy 
to see (using (P2)) that Dp satisfies the property (*) 
mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2. A syntactic characterisation 
of Dp may be found in [6]. For an example of an in­
ference in this logic consider again the fuzzy base u0 
from the previous examples. Then Dp(u0) (y) = 0.5, 
i.e., we infer that the probability of y is at least 0.5. 
To see this, we have 
Dp(uo)(y) = inf{p(y) I p E modMP(uo)}. 
Hence it suffices to show 0.5 S" p(y) for all p E 
modMP (u0), with equality holding for at least one 
p. To see this, first note that, using the properties of 
probability functions, we get p(x) = p(xlly) +p(xll�y) 
andp(x-+ y) = 1-p(�(x-+ y)) = 1-p(xll�y). Hence 
we may rewrite the first two constraints on p as 
0.75 S" p(x II y) + p(x II �y) and p(x II �y) :<:; 0.25. 
The first constraint gives 0.75- p(x II �y) :<:; p(x II y). 
Then using this with the second constraint gives 0.5 :<:; 
p(x II y). Since p(x II y) :<:; p(y) for any probability 
function we then get 0.5 :<:; p(y) as required. We obtain 
equality by choosing any p0 E modMP ( uo) such that 
Po(x II �y) = po(�x II �y) = 0.25 and Po(x II y) = 0.5. 
Note here that the answer for Dp(uo)(y) coincides with 
that for D1ud u0)(y) in the Lukasiewicz example above. 
In general, though, the two deduction operators will 
give different results.3 For example it can be shown 
that, in contrast to Dluk(uo), we get Dp(uo)(yllz) = 0. 
3 FUZZY BASE REVISION 
Now we have set up the basic framework we can state 
formally the question of revision we are interested in: 
Question. Assume a fixed abstract fuzzy deduction 
system (£, W, D) as background. Then given a fuzzy 
belief base u (representing our current (fuzzy) infor­
mation) and a pair (¢/a) E L x W (representing the 
new information that the truth-degree of ¢ is at least 
a), how should we determine U*(¢/a) which represents 
the revision of u to consistently incorporate the new 
information (¢/a)? 
The special case of crisp deduction systems is the case 
which is considered in the AGM framework. The idea 
there is to decompose the operation into two main 
steps. First, the initial (crisp) base u is altered if neces­
sary so as to "make room" for, i.e., become consistent 
with, the incoming crisp formula ¢. This is achieved 
by making u deductively weaker (contraction). Here 
3See also [9]. 
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we should adhere to the principle of minimal change, 
according to which this weakening should be made as 
"small" as possible. Then the new formula is simply 
joined on to the result (expansion). In partial meet 
revision [1, 11] the idea is to focus for the first step 
on those subsets of u which are consistent with </> and 
which are maximal with this property. Then, a cer­
tain number of the elements of this set are somehow 
selected as the "best" or "most preferred" and then 
their intersection is taken. The result of this intersec­
tion is then expanded by</>. We would like to generalise 
this procedure to apply to an arbitrary abstract fuzzy 
deduction system. In other words we want to use the 
following procedure to obtain u * (1>/a): 
1. Form the family of maximal fuzzy subsets of u 
which are consistent with (</>/a). We denote this 
family by u l_ (</>/a).4 
2. Select a subset of these: 
l(ul_(</>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a). 
3. Form the meet of the elements of this subset: 
nl(ul_ (1>/a)). 
4. Join (</>/a) to the result: 
u* (</>/a)= (nl(d(</>/a))) u (1>/a). 
We now fill in the details of the above sketched proce­
dure. First we formally define ul_(</>/a): 
Definition 4 Letu E F(L) and (</>/a) E LxW. Then 
ul_ (1>/a) is the set of elements of F(L) such that u' E 
ul_(</>/a) iff (i) u' � u, (ii) u' U (1>/a) is consistent, 
and (iii) for all u" � u, if u' C u" then u" U (1>/a) is 
inconsistent. 
Note in particular that if u U ( 1> /a) is consistent then 
ul_(</>/a) = {u}, while if (1>/a) is inconsistent then 
ul_(</>/a) = 0. We need to know that if (1>/a) is con­
sistent then u l_ ( 1>/ a) is non-empty. In fact this is the 
main place where the property of logical compactness 
of D is required. Under the additional assumption of 
Zorn's Lemma, it enables us to show the following: 
Proposition 5 Let v E F(L). If v � u and v U (</>/a) 
is consistent then there exists w E u l_ (</>/a) such that 
v �w. 
Proof {Sketch). First consider the set X = { u' E 
F(L) I v � u' � u, u' U (</>/a) is consistent}, par­
tially ordered by �· With the help of logical com­
pactness, it can be shown that, for every (non-empty) 
totally-ordered subset Y of X, the element U Y is an 
upper-bound for Y in X. (If Y is empty then v is an 
upper-bound for Y in X.) Applying Zorn's Lemma, 
we then deduce the existence of a maximal element w 
4In the (crisp) belief revision literature the talk is usu­
ally (and equivalently) of the set of "maximal subsets which 
fail to imply �¢", which is denoted by u l_ �</>. We prefer 
the slightly different notation which does not refer to any 
connectives. 
of X. It can then be shown that for any such w we 
have both w E u l_ (</>/a) and v � w. 0 
Taking v = UT in the above proposition gives us the 
desired non-emptiness for ul_(</>/a). We now define 
selection functions. 
Definition 5 Let u E F(L). A selection function for 
u is a function I such that for all (</>/a) E Lx W, (i) if 
ul_(</>/a) f. 0 then 0 f.l(ul_(</>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a), and 
(ii) iful_(</>/a) = 0 then l(ul_(</>/a)) = {u}. 
Intuitively, selection functions reflect the resistance to 
change of the items of information in u. Given u E 
F(L) and a selection function 1 for u we then define 
a revision operator *"� for u as follows: 
u*"� (</>fa)= (nl(d(</>/all) u (</>fa) 
Definition 6 Let u E F(L) and let * be an operator 
for u. Then * is an operator of partial meet fuzzy base 
revision (for u) iff*=*"� for some selection function 
1 for u. 
The following proposition is reminiscent of the Harper 
Identity from crisp revision [4]. It is used later in the 
proof of Theorem 1. 
Proposition 6 Let 1 be a selection function for u. 
Then u n (u*"� (</>/a))= nl(ul_(</>/a)).  
Proof (Sketch). For the "�" direction first note that 
un (u*"� (1>/a)) = (u n (nl(ul_(</>/a)))) u (u n (</>/a)) 
(using the distributivity of F( L)). Hence it suffices 
to show both u n (nl(ul_(</>/a))) � nl(ul_(</>/a)) 
and u n (</>/a) � nl(ul_(</>/a)). The former clearly 
holds. The latter too if (</>/a) is inconsistent (since 
then 1( u l_ ( 1>/ a)) = { u}), while if (</>/a) is consistent it 
can be shown that un(<j>fa) � u' for all u' E ul_(</>/a), 
which then suffices (since l(ul_(<f>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a) ). 
For the";;)" direction we need both n l(ul_ (1>/a)) � u 
and nl(ul_(</>/a)) � (nl(d(</>/a))) u (</>/a). The 
latter clearly holds, while for the former we have 
l(ul_(</>/a)) f. 0 and so, given u' E l(ul_(</>/a)),  we 
haven l(ul_ (1>/a)) � u' � u as required (since u' � u 
by definition of ul_ (</>/a)).  0 
Thus un ( u*"� (1>/ a)) may be equated with the result of 
"contracting" u to make room for the new item (</>/a). 
3.1 EXAMPLES 
Let us give an example of partial meet fuzzy base re­
vision "in action" for each of the instantiations of the 
framework we gave in Sect. 2.1. 
3.1.1 Crisp Deduction Systems 
For crisp deduction systems the operation reduces to 
the usual partial meet base revision from [11]. For 
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example suppose u = {x,x -t y,z} and suppose we 
receive the new information �(y 1\ z) (it is understood 
that all the stated formulas have degree 1). Then we 
get 
ul.(�(y/\z)) = {{x,x -t y},{x,z},{x-t y,z}}. 
Suppose our selection function 1 selects the first two 
subsets above: 1(ul. (�(y 1\z)) = { {x, x -t y }, {x, z} }. 
Then we get u *"� �(y 1\ z) = (nl(ul.(�(y 1\ z))) u 
{ �(y 1\ z)} = {x, �(y 1\ z)}. 
3.1.2 Lukasiewicz Fuzzy Logic 
Suppose u0 is given as in Sect. 2.1.2, i.e., uo = 
{(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.75), (z/0.25)}. Then suppose we 
receive the new information (�(y 1\z)/1), i.e., it is def­
initely not the case that y and z are true together. We 
know from the remark at the end of Sect. 2.1.2 that 
uo is inconsistent with this new information. In or­
der to make u0 consistent with (�(y 1\ z)/1) we need 
to modify it so that Dluk(u0)(y 1\ z) = 0. This can 
be achieved either by holding the truth-degrees of x 
and x -t y fixed while lowering that of z to 0, or by 
holding the truth-degree of z fixed and lowering that 
of either x or x -t y (or both) just enough to ensure 
Dluk(uo)(y) = 0. Precisely, we can show that 
uo l. ( �(y 1\ z)/1) ={ { (x/0. 75), (x -t y /0.75)}} U 
{ u' !:;; uo I 0.25 :<=::: u'(x), 
u'(x -t y) = 1- u'(x), 
u'(z) = uo(z)}. 
Suppose we prefer to keep the information item 
(x/0.75), and that this is reflected by applying the 
selection function 
l(uol.(�(y 1\ z)/1)) = {u' E uol.(�(y 1\ z)/1) I 
u'(x) = uo(x)}. 
Then, using u * as shorthand for uo *"� ( � (y 1\ z) /1), we 
have u*(�(y 1\ z)) = 1, while fore f. �(y 1\ z) we have 
u*(O) [nl(uol.(�(y/\z)/1))] (8) 
inf{u'(O) I u' E l(uol.Hy 1\ z)/1))}. 
Hence, as our final result we get u0 *"� (�(y 1\ z)/1) = 
{(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.25), HY 1\ z)/1)}. 
3.1.3 Necessity Logic 
Let uo be as in the previous example and suppose we 
get the new information (�(y 1\ z)/0.25). Then, since 
Supp(uo U HY 1\ z)/0.25)) = {x, x -t y, z, �(y 1\ z)} 
is en-inconsistent we know UQ U ( �(y 1\ Z) /0.25) iS in­
COnSistent. F inding the fuzzy subsets of u0 which are 
maximally consistent with (�(y 1\ z)/0.25) essentially 
reduces to finding the crisp subsets of Supp( u0) which 
are maximally en-consistent with �(y 1\ z): 
u0l.(�(y 1\ z)/0.25) = { {(x -t y/0.75), (z/0.25)}, 
{(x/0.75), (z/0.25)}, 
{(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.75)}} 
Hence so far this doesn't look much different from 
the case of crisp deduction systems. The only dif­
ference is that now not all the formulas have de­
gree 1. We have the option of using this extra ex­
pressiveness to actually help define a selection func­
tion, perhaps according to a principle that formu­
las with greater degrees should be kept whenever 
possible. Indeed this is the approach usually taken 
in works on belief revision within possibility theory 
such as [2]. For instance in the above example we 
could prefer to throw out the information item with 
the lowest degree, i.e., (z/0.25). This would be re­
flected by using a selection function for u0 such that: 
l(uo l. ( �(y 1\ z) /0.25)) = { { (xfO. 75), (x -t y /0. 75)}} 
Then 
nh(uo j_ HY 1\ z)/0.25))) = l(uo j_ HY 1\ z)/0.25)) 
and so u0 *"� (�(y 1\ z)/0.25) = {(x/0.75), (x -t 
y/0.75), (�(y 1\ z)/0.25)}.5 We remark, however, that 
there is nothing to stop us from defining 1 indepen­
dently of the degrees. 6 
3.1.4 Probability Logic (Lower Envelopes) 
For a probabilistic example let us again use the base 
uo from earlier and suppose this time we get new infor­
mation (�y/0.75) which, since as we saw in Sect. 2.1.4 
Dp(u0)(y) > 0.25, is inconsistent u0. Then it can be 
shown that 
uol.(�y/0.75) = {u'!:;; uo I 0.5 :<=::: u'(x), 
u'(x -t y) = 1.25- u'(x), 
u'(z) = uo(z)} 
Suppose our selection function 1 is defined by 
l(ul.(�y/0.75)) = {u' E ul.(�y/0.75) I 0.6 :<=::: u'(x)} 
reflecting a certain "level of security" behind the item 
of information (x/0.75): we are not willing to choose 
any subset of u0 in which the probability of x falls 
below 0.6. Then, using u* now as shorthand for 
u0 *"� ( �y /0. 75) we have u* ( �y) = 0. 75, while for 
5For a related approach see [16]. 
6In fact the question of the precise nature of the rela­
tionship between degrees of confidence (i.e., truth-degrees 
for us) and degree of resistance to change is one of the open 
philosophical problems in belief revision recently posed by 
Hansson [12]. 
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e oF �y we have 
u*(B) = [n /(uo_i(�y/0.75)) ] (B) 
inf {u'(B) I u' E l(uo_i(�y/0.75))}. 
Hence u0 *-y ( �y /0. 75) = 
{(x/0.6), (x-+ y/0.5) , ( z/0.25),(�y/0.75)}. 
4 CHARACTERISING PARTIAL 
MEET FUZZY BASE REVISION 
In this section we axiomatically characterise the class 
of partial meet fuzzy base revision operators. It turns 
out that the class is characterised by the following five 
postulates, each of which generalises a postulate from 
the corresponding axiomatisation from the crisp case 
[11]. On the right we list the usual names. 
(Fl) a :Sw [u* (<1>/a)](¢) (Success) 
(F2) U* (¢/a) is consistent if (¢/a) is consistent 
(Consistency) 
(F3) u *(<I>/ a) � u U (¢/a) (Inclusion) 
(F4) For all eEL, bE W, if b i:w [u* (¢/a)](B) 
and b :S w u( B) then there exists u' such that 
u *(¢/a)� u' � u U (¢/a), u' is consistent 
and u' u ( e I b) is inconsistent (Relevance) 
(F5) If, for all v � u, we have v U (¢/a) is consistent 
iff v U (¢'fa') is consistent, then u n (u *(¢/a)) 
= u n (u *(¢'fa')) (Uniformity) 
(Fl) says that the revision is successful, i.e., that after 
revision by (¢/a), the formula ¢ is assigned a truth­
degree of at least a. (F2) requires the result of revision 
to be consistent, provided the input is itself consistent. 
(F3) says that the revised base should not contain 
more information than that obtained by simply joining 
the original base with the new information. (F4) seeks 
to minimise unnecessary loss of information. Roughly, 
it expresses that if, for every consistent fuzzy base u' 
lying between u *(¢/a) and u U (¢/a), it is possible 
to raise the truth-degree of e from u'(B) to b without 
incurring inconsistency, then there is no reason for the 
revised truth-degree of e to fall below b. Finally for 
(F5), first note that un(u*(<l>/a)) can be understood 
as that information in u which is retained in u* (¢/a). 
Hence (F5) says that if two different inputs are con­
sistent with precisely the same fuzzy subsets of u then 
they remove the same information from u. We now 
give the main result of the paper, which generalises 
the characterisation given in [11] for crisp deduction 
systems. 
Theorem 1 Let u E F(L) and* be an operator for 
u. Then * is an operator of partial meet fuzzy base 
revision for u iff* satisfies (Fl)-(F5). 
Remarks on the proof. The proof is based on that of 
the special crisp case in [11]. The main difficulty arises 
from the unavailability in our more general case of the 
(Deduction) property. Also, it turns out that the only 
properties of D which are needed are logical compact­
ness and the following weakening of (Monotony): 
If v is consistent and u � v then u is consistent. 
This last remark also applies to propositions 5 and 6.7 
The next proposition gives us some more rules which 
can be derived from (Fl )-(F5). 
Proposition 7 Let u E F(L) and * be an operator 
for u which satisfies (Fl)-(F5). Then* also satisfies 
the following properties: 
(F6) If u U (<I>/ a) is consistent then 
u *(¢/a) = u U (¢/a) 
(F7) If u is consistent and a :S w u( ¢) then 
u *(¢/a) = u 
(F8) If u(¢) :Sw a then [u * (<1>/a)](¢) =a 
(F9) If (¢/a) is inconsistent then 
u *(¢/a) = u U (¢/a) 
(FlO) If D(¢/a) = D(¢' fa') then 
u n (u *(¢/a))= u n (u *(¢'fa')) 
(F6) is the "vacuity" property which says that if the 
new information (¢/a) is consistent with the current 
information u, then the new base is formed by sim­
ply adding (</>/a) to u. As a consequence of this we 
get (F7), which says that if u is consistent and ¢ is al­
ready explicitly assigned a truth-degree in u of at least 
a then revising by (¢/a) leaves the base unchanged. 
(F8) says that if u(¢) :Sw a then ¢ is assigned a 
truth-degree in the new base of precisely a. For the 
common case when W is linearly ordered, (F7) and 
(F8) together give: 
If u is consistent then [u *(¢/a)](¢) = u(¢) V://a. 
We remark, however, that it can be shown partial meet 
fuzzy base revision operators do not satisfy this prop­
erty in general. (F9) states that if the new informa­
tion is inconsistent then the new base is again formed 
by just adding it to the current information. Finally, 
(FlO) says that revising by information which is "log­
ically equivalent" removes the same information from 
u. The proof of Prop. 7 requires only the same prop­
erties of D as Theorem 1 ,  with one small exception: 
the derivation of (FlO) requires all three of the (gen­
eralised) Tarski properties. 
7For the crisp case, it is already noticed in [14, Sect. 3] 
that the only properties required of D are (Compactness) 
and (Monotony) (which, in the presence of (Deduction), is 
actually equivalent to its above weakening). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
We have considered the question of fuzzy belief base re­
vision within Gerla's general framework for fuzzy logic. 
We have defined and axiomatised the operation of par­
tial meet fuzzy base revision, which generalises the op­
eration of partial meet base revision from the usual 
crisp case. The fact that we obtained this axiomati­
sation with such relatively weak restrictions shows on 
the one hand how the ideas of rational belief change 
are general enough to be applied to reasoning under 
vagueness or uncertainty. On the other hand, it con­
firms that the types of fuzzy sy stems covered by our 
abstract setting are indeed appropriate for modelling 
the human capacity of making conclusions from uncer­
tain or vague premises. We have given some examples 
which show how the operation works in some specific 
instances of the framework, including those related to 
Lukasiewicz fuzzy logic and probability logic. 
In this paper the question of base revision has been 
investigated from a very high position on the abstrac­
tion ladder, with only a handful of properties assumed 
of the basic primitives. We have shown that it is nev­
ertheless possible to formulate basic properties of base 
revision operators. We would like to think of (F1)� 
(F5) as the absolute minimal core properties which 
any base revision operator should satisfy. However, 
as we move down the abstraction ladder, we fully ex­
pect to be able to say more. Furthermore, as the dif­
ferences between the various instantiations of our ab­
stract framework then come into focus, such as those 
between truth-functional logic and uncertainty calculi 
(e.g. probability logic), we also expect to be able to an­
swer another important question: are there postulates 
suitable for revision in one setting which are unsuitable 
in another? This will be left for future work, as will the 
consideration of postulates which govern the revision 
of a base by different, but related inputs. What, for 
example (assuming we work in LProp), is the connec­
tion between u *(¢/b) and u * (8 1\ ¢/b)? Also in this 
category would be some property of robustness, i.e., 
the idea that small changes in the degree a of the re­
vision input (¢/a) should cause only small changes to 
u*( ¢/a) (particularly relevant if W = [0 , 1]). Probably 
the fulfillment of conditions like these by partial meet 
fuzzy base revision operators will require some restric­
tion on the selection function I· Some preliminary in­
vestigations into the latter suggest we get robustness if 
we additionally restrict to continuous truth-functional 
semantics. Finally we would also like to study theory 
revision in this framework. 
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